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 The duty of employers to reasonably accommodate employees 
living with disabilities is fundamental and is invoked on a daily 
basis in response to various health conditions which employees 
experience, such as cancer. While executing this fundamental 
duty, employers must be mindful of other rights which 
employees have, such as the right to privacy. Employers run the 
risk of violating the employees' right to privacy in the process of 
accommodating them if the employer discloses confidential 
medical information which must be used only for the purpose of 
making accommodations for the employee concerned, in this 
context an employee with cancer. This paper focuses on the duty 
of employers to reasonably accommodate such employees, and 
the right to privacy of the employees. Further, this paper aims to 
investigate if a balance can be maintained between the duty of 
the employer to make such accommodations and the right to 
privacy of the employees.  
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1 Introduction 
The duty which is placed on employers to provide reasonable 
accommodation is a non-discriminatory mechanism in its constitutional 
form, and a juridical tool which is aimed at achieving substantive equality 
among people;1 and in this context, specifically employees with cancer. The 
principle of reasonable accommodation serves as an integral part of and is 
the justification for direct or indirect discrimination which is fair. This is due 
to the fact that reasonable accommodation gives recognition to equality. 
This principle recognises that in order to achieve equality among people, it 
might be necessary to treat people differently.2 In broad terms, reasonable 
accommodation entails taking positive steps in order to meet the needs of 
people who suffer from physical or psychological conditions which other 
people may not experience. If an employer takes positive steps to 
reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities, the employer cannot 
be viewed as acting discriminatorily; but instead his or her actions should 
be considered as positive steps taken towards eliminating any form of 
discrimination in the workplace. An employer must not violate the right to 
privacy of the employee with the disability while making such 
accommodations, the employee having disclosed his or her medical 
condition to the employer voluntarily and not as a legal duty. The employer 
must not use the information about the medical condition of the employee 
in an arbitrary manner which is unrelated to the duty to reasonably 
accommodate the employee, because this will amount to a violation of the 
right to privacy of the concerned employee. 
2 The rationale for and the foundation of the duty of the 
employer to reasonably accommodate employees with 
cancer 
In as much as employers are required to embrace diversity in the workplace, 
they are not expected to incur undue hardships in the process of embracing 
diversity.3 The type of reasonable accommodation required will depend on 
the nature and essential functions of the job, the work environment and the 
nature of the specific impairment experienced by each individual 
concerned.4 Reasonable accommodation on the part of the employer is 
                                            
* Charles Maimela. LLB LLM (Unisa). Lecturer in the Department of Private Law, 
University of Pretoria, South Africa. E-mail: charles.maimela@up.ac.za 
1  Bernard 2014 PELJ 2871. 
2  Ngwena Disabled People and the Search for Equality 460. 
3  Bernard 2014 PELJ 2880. 
4  BC Public Service Employee Relations Commission Manager's Guide 5. 
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based on three interrelated criteria which justify its purpose. Firstly, it must 
effectively remove the barriers or obstacles which prevent an individual 
employee who is otherwise qualified from being able to carry out his or her 
duties.5 Secondly, the accommodation must allow the individual employee 
with a disability to enjoy equal access to the benefits and opportunities of 
employment, such as the right to promotion in the workplace.6 Thirdly, 
employers can adopt the most cost-effective means which is consistent with 
the two criteria outlined above.7  
These three criteria serve as yardsticks for use in determining if the duty to 
provide reasonable accommodation has been fulfilled on the part of the 
employer. In such consideration the court will take into account the rational 
and proportional relationship between the measure employed and the 
purpose it seeks to achieve,8 which in the context of this study is to make it 
possible for employees with cancer to continue working, despite their 
medical condition, and to overcome any effect which their condition may 
possibly have on their ability to work.  
In the court case of MEC for Education, Kwazulu Natal v Pillay,9 the 
Constitutional Court stated that: 
… reasonable accommodation requires that the employer must take positive 
measures such as removing access barriers, even if it means incurring 
additional hardships or expenses to ensure that all employees enjoy their right 
to equality.10 
In the light of the above, Bernard argues that the duty of reasonable 
accommodation on the part of employers could either be positive, such as 
making alterations to the working environment to enable the employee with 
disability to work, or it could be negative, in cases where financial hardships 
can be incurred by the employer to effect the necessary alterations in the 
workplace in order to achieve equality in the workplace through reasonable 
accommodation.11 Bernard also notes that the duty on the part of employers 
to reasonably accommodate employees is not absolute in the sense that no 
                                            
5  BC Public Service Employee Relations Commission Manager's Guide 5-6. 
6  BC Public Service Employee Relations Commission Manager's Guide 6. 
7  BC Public Service Employee Relations Commission Manager's Guide 7. 
8  BC Public Service Employee Relations Commission Manager's Guide 7. 
9  MEC for Education, Kwazulu Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) (hereafter MEC for 
Education, KZN v Pillay case) para 73. 
10  MEC for Education, KZN v Pillay case para 73. 
11  Bernard 2014 PELJ 2881. 
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court can expect an employer to excessively incur expenses if it cannot 
reasonably accommodate the employee due to his or her state of health.12 
Reasonable accommodation aims to balance the interests of the employer 
and the employee concerned by ensuring that there is equity in 
employment, in order to avoid a situation where one party benefits at the 
expense of the other. This conclusion is inherent in the dictum that for the 
accommodation to be reasonable there must be a rational connection 
between the measure being employed to provide such accommodation and 
the purpose which it seeks to achieve. 
In Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU13 the court found that 
there was no justification for the claim to reasonable accommodation on the 
basis that there was no relationship between the measure and the purpose 
which the measure sought to achieve.14 This case involved a work policy in 
the Correctional Services Department which prohibited women from having 
dreadlocks in the workplace.15 However, all the employees, both male and 
female, were expected to wear similar clothing because the policy on 
uniform was the same for both genders except in regard to the hairstyle of 
female employees.16 The Department argued that the restriction applicable 
to female employees was justified as if they wore long hair such as 
dreadlocks this would put them at risk of being easily harmed by prison 
inmates.17 The rebuttal was that short hair for female employees was not an 
inherent requirement for the job in terms of section 187(2) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995.18 
It was found that the employees were still exemplary officers despite 
wearing their hair in dreadlocks.19 No evidence was submitted that the 
employees were less disciplined or performed their duties poorly as a result 
of their hairstyles. The discriminatory prohibition on dreadlocks was 
therefore found to be unfair, disproportionate and overly restrictive.20 The 
court held that: 
                                            
12  Bernard 2014 PELJ 2881. 
13  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU 2011 32 ILJ 2629 (LAC) (hereafter 
Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU case) para 41.  
14  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU case para 42. 
15  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU case para 42. 
16  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU case para 43. 
17  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU case para 43. 
18  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU case para 43. 
19  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU case para 44. 
20  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU case 2630. 
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[a] refusal to reasonably accommodate diversity and the lack of rationality in 
its measure aimed at the legitimate purpose of discipline, security and 
uniformity leads inescapably to the conclusion that the discriminatory 
prohibition on dreadlocks was unfair, disproportionate and overly restrictive.21 
The abovementioned case clearly displays the extent of the operation of the 
duty to provide reasonable accommodation on the basis of diversity, 
although it was denied by the employer in this case.  
Reasonable accommodation is a non-discriminatory principle in the sense 
that it ensures that employment equity is upheld in the workplace. Section 
15(1) of the Employment Equity Act makes room for the designated 
employer to implement affirmative action measures in order to ensure that 
all suitably qualified people from designated groups are represented in all 
categories of employment in the workplace.22 However, reasonable 
accommodation is not an affirmative action measure, although it can be 
used to ensure that equity is maintained in the workplace. Reasonable 
accommodation and affirmative action measures share similar goals such 
as to ensure that substantive equality is achieved in the workplace, but they 
are two different concepts which should not be mistakenly construed as 
one.23 
Furthermore, section 5 of the Employment Equity Act provides that every 
employer must take steps to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by 
eliminating unfair discrimination in any employment policy or practice.24 
Section 15(2)(c) of the Employment Equity Act places a duty on employers 
to ensure that they provide reasonable accommodation for employees living 
with disabilities. The aim of such accommodation is to reduce the impact of 
the impairment on the person's capacity to fulfil the essential functions of 
the job, and ensure that there is a culture of equity in the workplace.25 The 
duty of employers to reasonably accommodate employees emanates from 
section 9(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (hereafter 
referred to as the Constitution), which states that equality entails the full and 
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms by all persons. As such, 
legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance people or 
categories of people who are disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may 
be implemented with an aim to promote the spirit of equality in the 
                                            
21  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU case para 44-45. 
22  Section 15(1) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
23 Ngwena Disabled People and the Search for Equality 461. 
24 Section 5 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
25  Section 15(2)(c) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
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workplace.26 This is what is referred to as substantive equality, which simply 
means treating people equally while taking their background into account. 
In the Constitutional Court case of Minister of Finance v Van Heerden,27 the 
court reasoned that the legislation pertaining to substantive equality 
recognises that besides the uneven race, class and gender attributes of our 
society, there are other levels and forms of social differentiation and 
systemic privilege which still exist.28 The role of the Constitution is to enjoin 
us to dismantle them and to prevent the creation of new patterns of 
disadvantage. It is therefore important for the courts to scrutinise the 
complainants' situation in society in each case of equality claims. 
Furthermore, the courts should inquire into the complainants' history and 
vulnerability, as well as the history, nature and purpose of the discriminatory 
practice concerned, and whether it ameliorates or adds to the disadvantage 
experienced by a group in a real-life context, in order to determine its 
fairness in the light of the values of our Constitution.29 In the assessment of 
fairness or otherwise, a flexible but situation-sensitive approach is 
necessary because of the shifting patterns of harmful discrimination and the 
stereotypical response in our evolving democratic society. The enquiry into 
unfair discrimination takes place in several stages, as outlined above.30 
Therefore, in the context of patients with cancer as employees, their medical 
condition must not be isolated in assessing whether or not the employer has 
discriminated against them, because all employees are entitled to 
equality.31 Employees with cancer are also protected by the Employment 
Equity Act, as they may experience long-term or short-term impairment as 
a consequence of the side-effects of the treatment administered to them. At 
times, cancer treatment such as chemotherapy may render patients unable 
                                            
26  Section 9(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See further De 
Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law 421. They argue that the right 
to equality can best be described in two ways. Firstly, the right to equality does not 
entail a guarantee that all people should be treated identically all the time, regardless 
of their personal attributes or characteristics, social or economic status. The right 
should therefore be viewed as entailing more than a formal prohibition against 
discrimination. Secondly, the right to equality must guarantee more than equality 
before the law and must focus on the effects or impacts of legal rules or other 
differentiating treatment. The right to equality cannot therefore focus merely on 
whether two or more people have been treated in an identical manner by the legal 
rule or by the company or another individual concerned.  
27  Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) (hereafter Minister of 
Finance v Van Heerden case) para 26. 
28  Minister of Finance v Van Heerden case para 26. 
29  Minister of Finance v Van Heerden case para 27. 
30  Minister of Finance v Van Heerden case para 27. 
31  Kok 2001 TSAR 294-295. 
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to perform their duties effectively and result in their being categorised as 
being afflicted with a disability in terms of the Employment Equity Act.32  
The question of whether a disease such as cancer amounts to a disability 
for the purposes of the Employment Equity Act has not been tested in our 
courts. However, people who suffer from HIV/AIDS and are thereby 
rendered unable to work can claim a disability grant under the Social 
Assistance Act.33 It is possible to argue that since cancer has the potential 
to leave a person with a temporary or permanent disability in the form of a 
physical or a psychological impairment, then a person living with cancer 
could become unable to work and could surely claim a the grant under the 
Social Assistance Act, like a person with HIV/AIDS.34 Whether cancer or 
HIV/AIDS amounts to a disability is a question of fact which will be 
determined by a court of law on the basis of the facts of each case, including 
the effect of the disease on the overall health of the individual. However, 
only time will tell whether health conditions such as cancer will be 
recognised as disabilities in our law. In England and the USA cancer is 
recognised as a progressive disease which can render an employee unable 
to work. and it thus amounts to a disability.35 In those jurisdictions the law 
has responded to the societal challenge of cancer and hence its recognition 
as a progressive condition which can result to a disability. 
After the cancer has developed, the inability of an employee with cancer to 
perform his or her duties is likely to be influenced by a number of factors 
such as the employee's age, the stage at which the cancer was diagnosed, 
                                            
32  Section 5(1) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
33  Section 5 of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 states that people who are living 
with HIV/AIDS which renders them unable to work are entitled to a disability grant. 
However, the grant is conditional on the employee concerned being unable to 
continue with work. The moment the medical condition of the employee improves 
through treatment with ARV's, then the disability grant of the employee concerned 
will terminate. 
34  Section 9 of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 states the conditions in terms of 
which a person who suffers from HIV/AIDS can receive a disability grant, in 
circumstances where the HIV renders the person unable to work. The argument 
raised in this study is that cancer is a chronic disease which can render a person 
unable to work, just like HIV, and thus an employee with cancer whom the cancer 
has affected adversely can surely claim a disability grant. 
35  Refer to s 6(1) of the Equality Act, 2010, which states that a person is said to have 
a disability if he/she has a physical or mental impairment, and the impairment has a 
substantial and long-term adverse effect on the person's ability to carry out normal 
day-to-day activities. S 3 of the American Amended Discrimination Act, 2008 defines 
disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities of an individual, and record for such impairment is necessary for 
the purpose of this Act to prove the extent of the physical or mental impairment, in 
order to be considered as a disability. 
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the financial status and level of education of the patient, the physical 
demands of the job, and the presence of any other disease in the 
employee's body.36 The reason for outlining these factors is that in certain 
instances employees with cancer can resume work after treatment and can 
even seek further employment.37 However, in the case of physically 
demanding jobs, the position may be different.38 Most employees with 
cancer who return to work appear to be those who are highly 
knowledgeable, skilled and well-educated.39 Employees with cancer who 
don't know their rights regarding fair labour practice may be confronted with 
harsh and abusive circumstances when they return to work, owing to their 
lack of education and prior experience of the new circumstances.40 
Consequently, a large number of these uneducated employees end up by 
not returning to work, taking early retirement, or simply changing jobs.41  
The issue of reasonable accommodation is relevant to jobs which are 
physically demanding as well; because reasonable accommodation would 
obviously be necessary in jobs which require physical skills and strength. It 
would be reasonable and justifiable not to put an employee with cancer in a 
physically demanding job. When it comes to providing reasonable 
accommodation on the part of employers, the major problem area has to do 
with employees with cancer.42 They are usually reluctant to request 
reasonable accommodation because they are afraid of appearing as 
different; and also experience feelings of fear about their ability to work. 
Employees with cancer also fear having to disclose their health status as 
they anticipate that such disclosure will result in the violation of their right to 
privacy, as will be discussed below.43 Some of these difficulties may be 
attributed to the fact that employees with cancer tend to not want to become 
a burden to the employer due to their condition. In this regard employees 
with cancer have common feelings which they may experience as feelings 
of guilt.44 They are encouraged to overcome these negative emotions, 
because there is a legal duty that rests on the employer to accommodate 
their needs.45 This paper is aimed at emphasising that employees with 
                                            
36 Ganz Cancer Survivorship 272. 
37 Lindbohm et al 2004 EJC 2488. 
38  Cancer Council Australia date unknown http://www.cancer. 
org.au/content/pdf/AboutCancer/support/workingwithcancer_sect2.pdf. 
39 Cancer Journey Advisory Group Research 45. 
40 Doyal and Hoffman 2009 CME 458. 
41  Van Hoey 2017 http://www.cancer.net/coping/relationships-and-cancer/cancer-and-
workplace-discrimination. 
42  Stergiou-Kita et al 2015 J Cancer Surviv 489. 
43  Stergiou-Kita et al 2015 J Cancer Surviv 490. 
44  Stergiou-Kita et al 2015 J Cancer Surviv 491. 
45 Stergiou-Kita et al 2015 J Cancer Surviv 492. 
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cancer do not have to feel that the employer is doing them a favour by 
providing reasonable accommodation, because in actual fact this is a legal 
duty which rests on the employer, provided that the cancer renders the 
employee unable to work, as outlined above.46  
3 The essentials of the duty of the employer to provide 
reasonable accommodation in a general context 
The following paragraphs will be dedicated to discussing the main elements 
of reasonable accommodation in order to grasp understand the notion as it 
is defined in our law. Furthermore, the focus will shift slightly to highlight the 
role of knowledge in inducing the employee to claim the right to reasonable 
accommodation in the workplace. It is recognised that knowledge is power, 
and it is thus essential for all affected parties to understand what is required 
of them and to what extent they are protected by law. This discussion is 
aimed at establishing the exact nature and process of reasonable 
accommodation, especially in its practical rather than theoretical form. 
3.1 The meaning of reasonable accommodation  
The question of what precisely constitutes reasonable accommodation on 
the part of the employer has not been adequately tested in the Labour 
Courts.47 However, it may suffice to say that reasonable accommodation 
constitutes the act of making existing facilities more easily accessible; 
adapting existing equipment or acquiring new equipment for the purpose; 
re-organising workstations; providing specialised supervision; and 
restructuring work distribution, so that non-essential functions can be 
redirected to other people.48 In a nutshell, reasonable accommodation refers 
to making the necessary changes in the workplace in order to ensure that 
an employee can perform his or her core employment duties effectively. It 
ought to be noted that the obligation which rests on the employer to provide 
reasonable accommodation is not absolute. This duty need not be fulfilled 
if it will cause the business of the employer to suffer.49 This means that the 
employer will not need to make reasonable accommodation if the provision 
                                            
46 Section 15(2)(c) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
47 Marumoagae 2012 PELJ 350. 
48  Marumoagae 2012 PELJ 351. 
49  Marumoagae 2012 PELJ 352. 
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thereof is found to be contrary to the operational needs or requirements of 
the company.50  
The principle of reasonable accommodation was considered in Kievits 
Kroon Country Estate v Mmoledi.51 In this case the employee was dismissed 
from work after taking leave for the purposes of training to be a traditional 
healer.52 The employee applied for unpaid leave but the employer refused 
to grant the leave regardless of the employee's having submitted all the 
necessary documents pertaining to her initiation in support of her leave 
application.53 Upon her return to work the employee was subjected to a 
disciplinary hearing and she was dismissed for misconduct on the basis that 
she acted unlawfully by absconding from work without the approval of the 
employer.54 The employee took the matter to the CCMA, where the 
commissioner found the conduct of the employer to be unlawful, due to the 
fact that he did not exercise empathy towards and understanding of the 
cultural background of the employee. Therefore, the employer's refusal to 
grant the employee unpaid leave amounted to a failure to provide 
reasonable accommodation.55 On review, the Labour Court found that the 
decision of the commissioner in favour of the employee was reasonable and 
dismissed the review application that had been initiated by the employer.56 
The matter was taken on appeal to the Labour Appeal Court. The court held 
that both parties were required to be realistic in relation to each other in 
order to ensure harmony in the employer–employee relationship, and to 
achieve a united society.57 Accommodating one another was nothing other 
than asserting the spirit of "Ubuntu", which was part of the heritage of our 
society, and which ought to be upheld in all relationships. Accordingly, the 
appeal was dismissed with costs, on the basis that the employer failed to 
accommodate the employee's cultural and religious practices by refusing to 
grant her leave to undergo this practice.58 
According to the approach adopted by the courts, employers ought to 
appreciate the kind of society in which we live. As there is a rapid increase 
                                            
50 In terms of the inherent requirements of the job or the operational needs of the 
business the employer can dismiss the employee on this ground and will not be 
viewed as unfair dismissal in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
51  Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v Mmoledi 2012 11 BLLR 1099 (LAC) 
(hereafter Kievits Kroon Country Estate v Mmoledi case) para 12. 
52  Kievits Kroon Country Estate v Mmoledi case 1099. 
53  Kievits Kroon Country Estate v Mmoledi case para 13. 
54  Kievits Kroon Country Estate v Mmoledi case para 14. 
55  Kievits Kroon Country Estate v Mmoledi case para 16. 
56  Kievits Kroon Country Estate v Mmoledi case para 16. 
57  Kievits Kroon Country Estate v Mmoledi case para 18. 
58  Kievits Kroon Country Estate v Mmoledi case para 18. 
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in the number of persons living with cancer; it is vital for employers to pay 
attention to this reality and for employees to also understand that they are 
obliged to do only what they reasonably can to accommodate them. In the 
case sketched above, it is clear that the court ruled in favour of the employee 
because the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the cultural beliefs 
of the particular employee. In the context of an employee with cancer, the 
courts are likely to find that an employer would be acting unreasonably if he 
or she were to fail to recognise that a particular employee with cancer 
required extended leave for the purposes of obtaining therapy and 
treatment.  
The aspect of reasonable accommodation was best summed up in the court 
case of Ontario Public Services Employees Union v Ontario (Ontario Human 
Rights Commission),59 in which it was held that the most appropriate 
reasonable accommodation is one that definitely respects the dignity of the 
individual with a disability; one that meets the individual's needs; one that 
best promotes the integration and full participation of the individual 
concerned; and one that ensures that confidentiality is well maintained 
throughout.60 Therefore, by accommodating an employee in this way the 
rights to equality and human dignity are effectively restored and upheld by 
the employer.61 As this paper is aimed at ensuring that employees with 
cancer neither lose their right to enter into any form of occupation nor have 
their human dignity violated in the process, this paper endorses the 
description of what is termed appropriate accommodation as described in 
the Ontario case above.62 The principle which is derived from this case is 
that basic knowledge and understanding of cancer is important in order to 
ensure that equity and human dignity is restored in the workplace, as 
protected by the Constitution.63 In addition, employees also need to have 
knowledge of and understand the contents of their right to be reasonably 
                                            
59  Ontario Public Services Employees Union v Ontario (Ontario Human Rights 
Commission) 2015 ONCA 495 (hereafter Ontario Public Services Employees Union 
v Ontario case). In this case an employee experienced unfair discrimination in the 
workplace. She was discriminated against on the basis of gender while working as 
a cook in a prison facility. The conduct of the employer was found to be unfair on the 
basis that it discriminated unjustly against the applicant just because she was a 
female, and on the grounds that she was being treated differently from her male 
colleagues. 
60  Ontario Public Services Employees Union v Ontario case para 12. 
61  Ontario Public Services Employees Union v Ontario case para 12. 
62  Ontario Public Services Employees Union v Ontario case para 13. 
63  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 protects the right to human 
dignity in terms of s 10, and the right to enter into trade or occupation is protected in 
terms of s 23. Also see the Ontario Public Services Employees Union v Ontario case 
497. 
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accommodated by the employer, as this forms a constituent part of ensuring 
that their rights are effectively enforced. 
3.2 The role of knowledge regarding workplace accommodation 
First and foremost, knowledge regarding workplace accommodation is 
crucial to starting the process. This entails that the employee know about 
his or her right to request reasonable accommodation, and that the 
employer understand his or her corresponding duty to provide for such 
accommodation.64 If both parties are knowledgeable on this issue, this 
should ensure that the employee is successfully re-integrated in the 
workplace, as their mutual knowledge would be conducive to open 
communication between them.65 
3.3 The employer's ability to provide reasonable accommodation 
Part of the process of enforcing the employee's right to be reasonably 
accommodated is that an affected employee has to establish through a 
discussion with the employer whether the employer has the ability to provide 
such reasonable accommodation or not based on operational requirements 
of the company. The employee will first have to request the provision of 
reasonable accommodation in order to initiate the necessary 
communication between the parties; and thereafter will be able to establish 
whether his or her request can be met.66 In return, this process will allow for 
an understanding between the parties, and for the employer to assess his 
or her position with regards to providing reasonable accommodation without 
incurring any form of undue hardships. The reasonable accommodation to 
be provided should be beneficial for both the employer and the employee.67 
Thus, to facilitate this mutual benefit the two parties ought to negotiate their 
approach to the matter and finally agree on the way forward. 
3.4 The negotiation of reasonable accommodation 
An important factor to be taken into account is the negotiation of reasonable 
accommodation. This entails that the employer and the employee with 
cancer ought to enter into a form of a negotiation regarding their respective 
needs in order to reach a mutual understanding of how best to address 
them, and finally agree on a reasonable accommodation plan which benefits 
                                            
64  Fesko 1999 https://www.communityinclusion.org/article.php?article_id=77 4. 
65  Fesko 1999 https://www.communityinclusion.org/article.php?article_id=77 4-5. 
66  Fesko 1999 https://www.communityinclusion.org/article.php?article_id=77 6. 
67  Shaw and Feuerstein 2004 J Occup Rehabil 216. 
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both of them.68 Smaller companies and those companies that are struggling 
to stay financially afloat tend to have difficulty in providing reasonable 
accommodation for employees with cancer; hence the proposed process of 
negotiation between the parties is important.69 This could be described as 
a give-and-take process as it is not aimed at unduly benefitting one party at 
the expense of the other. Ultimately, the process is designed to ensure that 
equity is maintained by allowing both the employer and the employee with 
cancer to receive a benefit out of the facilitation of reasonable 
accommodation. 
4 Reasonable accommodation in the context of employees 
with cancer 
In the context of cancer, reasonably accommodating an employee with 
cancer entails conducting a four-staged inquiry in order to ensure that the 
employee is fully re-integrated into the workplace. The elements described 
above as forming part of the concept of reasonable accommodation remain 
relevant in the case of employees with cancer. However, the following 
elements are specifically applicable to the process of reasonably 
accommodating an employee with cancer from a European perspective, 
and could serve as the foundation for the South African position. 
4.1 A gradual return to work and flexibility 
Firstly, an employee with cancer should return to work gradually. This 
requires that there be flexibility in re-integrating him or her into the 
workplace, as he or she will have been away from work for a while.70 
Progressive re-integration consists of allowing the employee with cancer to 
do fewer hours of work and facilitating flexibility, such as allowing him or her 
to take work home where possible. This would surely assist with building 
both the physical and mental strength of the employee with cancer and 
would be beneficial to his or her health.71 During the process of re-
integrating the employee in the workplace, his or her right to privacy must 
also not be compromised, as the employer must allow for the employee with 
cancer to take medication in a private area.72 This would boost the self-
confidence of the employee and facilitate a speedy recovery. Furthermore, 
this might help in avoiding the situation where the employee has to take 
                                            
68  Shaw and Feuerstein 2004 J Occup Rehabil 217. 
69  Ganz Cancer Survivorship 21-22.  
70 Kennedy 2007 Eur J Cancer Care 17. 
71 Kennedy 2007 Eur J Cancer Care 18. 
72 Kennedy 2007 Eur J Cancer Care 18. 
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medication in front of his or her colleagues, who may possibly make the 
employee feel inferior by having to answer questions about his or her health 
condition.73 
4.2 Modifications of work and performance expectations 
Secondly, the duty of the employer to modify the work and performance 
expectations of the employee requires the elimination of some duties which 
the employee with cancer used previously to carry out.74 While this is being 
done it must be kept in mind that the employee is still recovering and 
possibly undergoing treatment; and thus the employer must be reasonable 
enough to accept that work which previously used to be completed in an 
hour could now probably be done in one hour and thirty minutes instead.75 
4.3 Retraining the employee with cancer  
Thirdly, the employer has a duty to train the employee with cancer again 
upon his or her return to work. It is important to note that training the 
employee upon his or her return does not constitute demotion, which would 
be an unfair labour practice.76 In this context, the purpose of training the 
employee once again has to do with assisting the employee to do his or her 
work, with the assistance of a mentor or colleague.77 The duty to train the 
employee all over again is normally dependent on the duration of the period 
for which the employee with cancer has been away from work. The longer 
the employee with cancer has been away from work, the more likely it is that 
he or she will require training. Employees usually react well to this retraining, 
as it helps to ensure that they are re-integrated in the workplace 
effectively.78 
4.4 Modification of the physical workplace environment 
Modifying the physical workplace environment and providing adaptive aids 
and technologies for employees with cancer is a duty that entails removing 
any obstacle which might prevent the employee from doing his or her job; 
as well as providing the relevant employee with a conducive work-station.79 
For example, if the work of an employee who suffers from a physical 
                                            
73  Kennedy 2007 Eur J Cancer Care 18. 
74 Kennedy 2007 Eur J Cancer Care 18-19. 
75 Kennedy 2007 Eur J Cancer Care 20. 
76 Refer to Mehnert 2011 Crit Rev Oncol Hematol 109; Kennedy 2007 Eur J Cancer 
Care 20. 
77 Kennedy 2007 Eur J Cancer Care 21. 
78  Kennedy 2007 Eur J Cancer Care 21. 
79  Kennedy 2007 Eur J Cancer Care 22. 
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deformity requires moving up and down stairs, then the employer can 
recommend that he or she should use a lift or should be stationed where he 
or she does not need to move up and down when conducting his or her 
duties. This will amount to reasonable accommodation. With regard to the 
physical environment, reasonable accommodation might include the 
adaptation of various features such as the modification of the office 
temperature. It might also be necessary to change the working shifts to 
accommodate the employee's medical check-up routine, to permit the 
employee to work from home, and to call a doctor although the general 
policy of the employer might prohibit the use of the company's telephone for 
personal reasons.80 
The focus of the paper will now shift to the right to privacy of the employee 
with cancer, while the employer is providing reasonable accommodation to 
the employee concerned. 
5 The right to privacy 
Before discussing the right to privacy in South African law, it is important to 
note that the Constitution entrenches this right in section 14.81 Furthermore, 
it is necessary to take into consideration that the right to privacy is also 
upheld and protected by various statutes. These include the Protection of 
Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 and the National Health Act 61 of 2003.82 
For the purposes of this paper only the common law and constitutional 
position with regard to the right to privacy will be explored. Furthermore, it 
is important for the reader to take note of the fact that the right to privacy is 
broad and a lot of cases have come before our courts; but for the purposes 
of this paper, only the landmark cases which form part of the backbone of 
the right to privacy in terms of both the common law and the Constitution 
will be referred to. 
                                            
80  Kennedy 2007 Eur J Cancer Care 22. 
81  Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and s 2(a) of the 
Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013, which set out the purpose of the 
Act by stating that the aim of the Act is to give effect to the constitutional right to 
privacy by safeguarding personal information when processed by a responsible 
party, subject to justifiable limitations that are aimed balancing the right to privacy 
against other rights, particularly the right to access to information; and by protecting 
important interests, including the free flow of information within the Republic and 
across international borders. 
82  Section 2 of the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 and s 14 of the 
National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
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5.1  The common law definition of privacy 
Under common law, every person has personality rights such as the rights 
to physical integrity, freedom, reputation, dignity and privacy.83 According to 
Neethling, privacy is defined as an individual condition of a person's life, 
which is characterised by seclusion from the public and publicity.84 As a 
person may determine that certain personal facts are to be excluded from 
the knowledge of other people, this means that the right to privacy is violated 
when a person learns of private information about another person without 
the consent of the latter.85 
The right to privacy has long been entrenched in the common law, in which 
everyone has personality rights, which include the right to physical integrity, 
freedom, reputation, dignity and privacy.86 The right to privacy has been 
recognised as an independent personal right that applies to both natural 
persons and juristic persons, such as companies.87 The violation of the right 
to privacy is determined by the court in terms of the reasonableness 
standard in terms of the interests of the community in order to guard against 
any form of injustice perpetrated against an individual or a company.88 
Privacy underpins dignity, since a violation of the right to privacy infringes 
on the right to dignity.89 This is because these two rights relate to each other, 
in the sense that the right to privacy ensures that one is entitled to maintain 
the confidentiality of information the publication of which may damage the 
dignity of the person.90 
                                            
83  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 31. 
84  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 32. 
85  Roos 2008 PELJ 62. 
86  Roos 2008 PELJ 62-63. 
87  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 217. 
88  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 218.  
89  Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that 
everyone has the right to dignity and to have his or her dignity respected and 
protected. 
90  See C v Minister of Correctional Services 1996 4 SA 292 (T) 293. In this case the 
plaintiff was a prisoner in the custody of the defendant, which was the department of 
correctional services in Johannesburg. The plaintiff was working in the kitchen to 
help with the preparation of food for other inmates. The Department of Correctional 
Services (appearing as the defendant) informed all inmates that it would conduct an 
HIV/AIDS testing session for all inmates and they were at liberty to refuse to undergo 
the tests should they so wish. In this case the plaintiff claimed that his right to privacy 
was violated on the basis that he was told that he had HIV in the presence of other 
inmates and was not provided with all the necessary counselling. The court held that 
indeed the defendant department had violated the right to privacy of the plaintiff on 
the basis that the informed consent of the plaintiff had not been obtained and the 
plaintiff had not been provided with all the counselling necessary to enable him to 
deal with the trauma. The people who conducted the testing had not been qualified 
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This rich history which emanates from common law with regard to the right 
to privacy and other related rights such as dignity and reputation clearly 
affirms Burchell's view that "the common law of privacy in South Africa still 
provides the lion's share when it comes to the right to privacy standard".91 
This is despite the fact that currently, in the new constitutional dispensation, 
the rights to privacy, dignity, reputation and freedom are recognised 
individually and independently in order to give them greater import, which 
was not the position in common law, where these rights were treated 
collectively rather than individually.92  
5.2  Legality of the common law right to privacy in the constitutional 
era 
The right to privacy has long been protected in our law, dating back from 
the time it was inherited from the Roman law system, in which the actio 
iniuriarum was provided as a remedy in cases where there was an invasion 
of the sanctity of a person's home.93 This was the position before the 
constitutional dispensation came into existence and provided for the right to 
privacy in terms of section 14 of the Constitution.94 Two examples of case 
decisions dealing with the common law right to privacy can be found in the 
1900s. An English case will be discussed first and a South African case 
thereafter. 
In Tolly v Fry and Sons Ltd95 the plaintiff was an amateur golfer and the 
defendant was a producer of candy. The defendant, in his advertisement of 
chocolates, showed the plaintiff with a bar of chocolate protruding from his 
                                            
medical personnel but staff members of the department, and this was inappropriate. 
The right to privacy of the plaintiff had been compromised in the sense that he had 
been told of his status in front of other inmates and this could result in his 
experiencing discrimination and marginalisation from other inmates owing to his HIV 
status. The defendant department was ordered to compensate the plaintiff for all the 
loss he had suffered as a result of the violation of his right to privacy. 
91  Burchell 1999 SALJ 1. 
92  Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 protects the right 
to privacy; s 10 of the Constitution protects the right to human dignity and s 12 of the 
Constitutionprotects the right to freedom and security of everyone. 
93  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality 253. The remedy with regard to 
the actio iniuriarum, which developed from Roman law, was established and used to 
recover damages (Solatium) based on the intentional infringements of one of the 
acknowledged personality rights. In order to succeed with this remedy, an 
infringement of a legally acknowledged interest of personality is required and such 
infringement has to be intentional in the process. Refer further to Jackson v NICRO 
1976 3 SA 1 (A) 11, in which the history and purpose of this Roman remedy was 
clearly outlined and applied. 
94  Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
95  Tolly v Fry and Sons Ltd [1931] AC 333; [1931] UKHL 1 (hereafter Tolly v Fry case). 
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back pocket.96 This advertisement was not done with the consent of the 
plaintiff, and the plaintiff challenged it on the basis that it violated his right to 
dignity and privacy. Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that the advertisement 
was been composed and published without his consent; and that it had the 
potential to destroy his golfing career, as he was still an amateur.97 The 
court found the conduct of the defendant as unlawful and ordered the 
defendant to compensate the plaintiff for the loss or harm which he had 
suffered as a result of the advertisement.98 
In the case of O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd99 the 
plaintiff was a well-known radio personality who consented to the publication 
of her photograph, taken at a pistol range, to be used for a newspaper article 
by the defendant company.100 The defendant company, however, used the 
photograph of the plaintiff for advertising purposes, which was not what the 
plaintiff consented to in the first place. Watermeyer AJ held the view that the 
conduct of the respondent company was unlawful and that the respondent 
acted contrary to the right to privacy of the plaintiff. The respondent was 
ordered to compensate the plaintiff for the violation of her right to privacy 
with regard to the derogatory advertisement.101  
5.3  The right to privacy in terms of section 14 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 
Section 14 of the Constitution states that everyone has the right to privacy, 
which includes the right not to have their person or their home searched, 
their property searched, their possessions seized, or the privacy of their 
communications infringed.102 Schoeman defines privacy as a state or 
condition of limited access to a person.103 The right to privacy was also 
considered in National Media Ltd ao v Jooste.104 Harms AJ explained that 
the right to privacy can best be described as an individual condition of life 
characterised by its being kept from the public and publicity. This condition 
includes all personal facts which the individual has determined to be 
excluded from the knowledge of other people and in respect of which he or 
                                            
96  Tolly v Fry case 334. 
97  Tolly v Fry case 334. 
98  Tolly v Fry case 334-335. 
99  O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd 1954 3 SA 244 (C) (hereafter 
O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Company case) 245. 
100  O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Company case 244. 
101  O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Company case 245. 
102  Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
103  Schoeman Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy 5.  
104  National Media Ltd ao v Jooste 1996 3 SA 262 (A) (hereafter National Media Ltd ao 
v Jooste case) 263. 
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she wills that they be kept private.105 Kennedy and Arnold v Ireland106 takes 
the discussion of the right to privacy further by stating that:  
… though not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution, the right to privacy 
is one of the fundamental personal rights of the citizen which flow from the 
Christian and democratic nature of the state. The nature of the right to privacy 
must be such as to ensure the dignity and freedom of an individual in the type 
of society envisaged by the Constitution, namely a sovereign, independent 
and democratic society.107 
This reasoning by the court surely infers the position of the South African 
judiciary in this democratic state, which will protecting the right to privacy of 
an individual from other people.  
6 The duty of the employee to disclose and its effect on the 
employer's duties to provide reasonable accommodation 
An employee can voluntary disclose to the employer that he or she has been 
diagnosed with cancer, and to further disclose the effect of the disease on 
his or her capacity.108 The employee with cancer is strongly encouraged to 
disclose his or her cancer status in order to allow the employer to assist the 
employee with the necessary reasonable accommodation. This disclosure 
will ensure that the employer is in a position to make the necessary 
                                            
105  National Media Ltd ao v Jooste case 262-263. 
106  Kennedy and Arnold v Ireland [1987] IR 587. 
107  Kennedy and Arnold v Ireland [1987] IR 587. 
108  See Devane Making the Shift 11 and Herbst CANSA Guidelines 14-16, which state 
that the employee needs to disclose as soon as possible to the employer that he or 
she has been diagnosed with cancer. The employee must explain to the employer 
the treatment that he or she will be taking and the effect of this treatment on the 
ability of the employee to perform his or her duties. This will enable the employer to 
understand the capabilities of the employee and at some stage to make necessary 
changes to the working conditions of the employee. This social responsibility is in 
line with s 9 of the Constitution, which promotes equality and prohibits unfair 
discrimination. This is what CANSA strives to achieve through robust awareness of 
education as to what cancer is, by communication between the employer and the 
employee with cancer. If this is the position then the objective of eliminating 
discrimination both in society in general and in the work place in particular will surely 
be achieved, through knowledge and awareness about cancer; but all of this starts 
with communication as it has been achieved in the fight against HIV/AIDS through 
greater awareness and education. The employee is expected to come up with 
solutions and explain how he or she is going to cope during this period. The 
employee can also ask for assistance on the part of the employer to allow him or her 
to effectively do his or her duties. These social responsibilities ascribed by CANSA 
to the employee resemble the duties which are set out by the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act as pertaining to the employee. It is clear that CANSA has ensured 
that it will be easy for both the employee and the employer to accept these 
responsibilities because they are in line with the Basic Conditions of Employment 
and do not require the employer to do anything extraordinary which is contrary to his 
or her business interests or contrary to the provisions of the law. 
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arrangements to accommodate the employee in the work place, because 
the employer will now be aware of the medical condition of the employee.109 
However, this disclosure of the employee is protected in terms of section 14 
of the Constitution, which refers to a person's right to privacy.  
This means that the disclosure which the employee with cancer provides to 
the employer binds the employer not to disclose this information to people 
outside the employment setup, as that would amount to unlawful disclosure 
and would constitute a violation of section 14 of the Constitution.110 
However, any disclosure by the employer to fellow employees so as to 
assist the employee with re-integration in the workplace will not amount to 
the violation of section 14 of the Constitution.111 In this context Hyundai 
Motor Distributors v Smit serves as the basis. The Constitutional Court 
stated therein that:  
… the right to privacy is implicated whenever a person has the ability to decide 
what he or she wishes to disclose to the public [;] and the expectation that 
such decision will be respected is reasonable.112  
                                            
109  Section 15(2)(c) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
110  The right to privacy is a fundamental constitutional right which is protected in terms 
of s 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
111  In this case the employee with cancer must provide consent for the employer to 
disclose his or her medical condition to fellow employees in order to safeguard the 
right of the employee to privacy. See s 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996. 
112  In In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 
545 (CC) 545. This case dealt with an important issue regarding the circumstances 
under which judicial officers may grant a warrant of search and seizure for the 
purposes of investigating criminal activity. The matter arose when the respondents, 
including Mr Rautenbach and the "Wheel of Africa" group of companies applied to 
the Transvaal High Court for relief following a raid on their offices in November 1999 
during which a large quantity of documents and computer records were seized. In 
the High Court, Southwood J declared s 29(5) read with ss 28(13) and (14) of the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 ("the Act") unconstitutional to the 
extent that these provisions permitted the authorisation of a search warrant by a 
judicial officer in the absence of reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence had 
been committed. The matter was referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation 
of the order declaring these provisions unconstitutional. The appellants lodged an 
appeal against this order. The Act creates a framework for the establishment of 
specialised bodies, called Investigating Directorates, to investigate certain specified 
offences. Three Investigating Directorates have been established since the 
commencement of the Act. In order to fulfil their mandate of successfully 
investigating and ultimately prosecuting offenders of these specific crimes, 
Investigating Directorates may conduct two types of investigatory procedure, an 
"inquiry" and a "preparatory investigation". S 29 grants the Investigating Directorates 
powers to search and seize property, in order to facilitate its investigations. 
Limitations are placed by the Act on the exercise of such powers and one of these 
is a requirement that the search and seizure of property must occur only once a 
C MAIMELA  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  21 
Currently, in the new constitutional dispensation, there are various court 
cases that serve as precedent in protecting the right to privacy in our law, 
and which ought to be discussed in order to give a comprehensive layout of 
the constitutional right to privacy and the manner in which it is upheld by the 
                                            
warrant has been issued by a judicial officer. A search warrant may be granted if the 
evidence before the judicial officer meets an appropriate standard. This standard in 
the context of an inquiry clearly requires a reasonable suspicion that a specified 
offence has been committed. The exact nature of the standard set by s 29(5) in the 
context of a preparatory investigation and the constitutional validity thereof was the 
subject of challenge in this case. The Constitutional Court, in a unanimous decision 
delivered by Langa DP, declined to confirm the order of the High Court. It was held 
that the right to privacy is clearly violated in a search and seizure operation 
envisaged by the Act. However, according to a proper interpretation of s 29(5), an 
adequate justificatory basis has to be provided for the suspicion that an offence has 
been committed before a judicial officer may authorise a search warrant for the 
purposes of a preparatory investigation. Langa DP held that the section provides 
sufficient safeguards against an unwarranted invasion of privacy and thus meets the 
requirements of the limitations clause. In order to reach the conclusion that s 29(5) 
was consistent with the Constitution, a proper interpretation of this section had to be 
arrived at. This interpretive exercise had to be performed in the light of the principle 
of constitutional interpretation that judicial officers must prefer interpretations of 
legislation that fall within constitutional bounds over those that do not, provided that 
such an interpretation can be reasonably ascribed to the section. Under the new 
constitutional order, statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of 
Rights and, in particular, in light of its 'spirit, purport and objects'. Langa DP went on 
to undertake a detailed analysis of the relevant provisions. Upon a reading of s 29(5) 
in the context of a preparatory investigation, it appeared that there was indeed a 
requirement that a judicial officer should issue a warrant only where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that an article connected with a preparatory 
investigation is on certain specific premises. The Act was, however, not explicit 
regarding the class of offences in respect of which the reasonable suspicion must 
exist. The purpose of a preparatory investigation is to determine whether there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that a specified offence - which falls within the 
jurisdiction of an Investigating Directorate - has been committed. It is clear that, as a 
result, a precondition for the issue of a warrant for the purposes of a preparatory 
investigation must be something less than a reasonable suspicion that a specified 
offence has been committed. There could be instances where an Investigating 
Directorate wishes to search and seize property for the purposes of a preparatory 
investigation in order to determine whether an offence that has come to its attention 
is in fact a specified offence that falls within its jurisdiction. In those circumstances, 
there may well be a reasonable suspicion that an offence, which might be a specified 
offence, has been committed. Thus, a requirement that there be reasonable grounds 
to suspect that an offence had been committed is not inconsistent with the purpose 
of a preparatory investigation. The effect of this decision is that the Act is to be read 
in future by judicial officers as conferring on them the authority to grant search and 
seizure warrants for purposes of a preparatory investigation only in circumstances 
where there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence, which might be a 
specified offence, has been committed. In such circumstances, a balance is struck 
between protecting the right to the privacy of individuals and promoting the important 
interest of the state in the effective investigation of criminal activity so as to curb the 
high incidence of crime in our society. The appeal accordingly succeeded and the 
court declined to confirm the order of the High Court.  
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courts. Furthermore, one also has to account for court cases which 
specifically dealt with the aspects of how to balance the employee's right to 
privacy with his or her duty to disclose certain conditions such as cancer. 
For example in Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council113 a 
raid had been carried out in the surgery of a Dr Mistry in Pinetown by an 
inspector and a health official without Dr Mistry's consent and knowledge.114 
They seized medicines and other health equipment from his medical centre, 
and as a result of this Dr Mistry brought the matter to court in order get a 
ruling on the constitutionality of section 28 of the Medicines and Related 
Substance Act Control Act 101 of 1965. He further claimed for the items 
which were taken from his medical centre during this search to be returned 
to him; and finally he argued that the conduct of the inspector and health 
official was in actual fact violating his right to privacy.115  
Sachs J delivered the unanimous judgment in which he held that the 
provisions which are in place to guide the approach of state officials when 
entering the private property of civilians are important in a democratic 
society, as against in a police state.116 He held further that these provisions 
secure respect for people's right to privacy, while at the same time ensuring 
that police officers act within the boundaries of the law and do not act as 
they please. In passing, Sachs J noted that South Africa has a rich history 
of police brutality and anarchy, which had had dire consequences of 
violating the human rights to privacy and dignity, and he emphasised that 
such conduct was not acceptable in the new constitutional dispensation.117 
The protection of the right to privacy of all citizens was important and 
fundamental. 
Section 28(1) of the Medicines and Related Substance Control Act grants 
inspectors a wide scope of powers to enter into the private dwellings of 
people and is undoubtedly unconstitutional because it contravenes the 
                                            
113  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council 1998 4 SA 1127 (CC) (hereafter 
Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council case), the constitutionality of s 
28(1) of the Interim National Medical and Dental Council Act 101 of 1965 (Medicines 
Act), which authorises inspectors of the institution to enter any premises, vessels, 
cars and aircraft to search and seize medical equipment and medicines on a 
reasonable belief that illegal activities are being committed. This compromised the 
right to privacy as provided for in terms of s 14 of the then Interim Constitution. 
114  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council case para 14. 
115  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council case para 14. 
116  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council case para 15. 
117  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council case para 15. 
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Constitution as it undermines and compromises people's right to privacy.118 
The claim instituted by Dr Mistry regarding the violation of his right to privacy 
and for the return of the goods which were taken during the search was 
rejected by the court.119 The reason for the court's rejection of the claim was 
because his right to privacy had not been violated as the inspector had not 
communicated the information about the search to third parties; and further, 
Dr Mistry had failed to prove that the law in terms of which these officials 
had acted was in actual fact invalid at the time the goods were taken.120 In 
this case is clear that Dr Mistry failed to discharge his onus of proof on a 
balance of probabilities that the health inspector acted unlawfully. 
7 Balancing the employee's right to privacy with the 
employee's option to disclose his or her medical 
condition  
An employee with cancer who discloses his or her health condition to the 
employer surely expects a level of respect and tolerance on the part of the 
employer in order to maintain a good working relationship with the employer 
and fellow employees. However, in practice employees with cancer are 
cautious when it comes to disclosing their medical condition to their 
employers,121 since they fear being categorised or stereotyped as people 
who have cancer.122 Employees with cancer are typically reluctant to 
disclose their medical condition to their employers because they believe that 
their employers and fellow employees will treat them differently once they 
know about their medical condition. Disclosure makes them less attractive 
for job opportunities, as employers are likely to find it difficult to provide 
employees with cancer with reasonable accommodation in order for them 
to function well in the workplace.123  
                                            
118  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council case 886 and s 28(1)(a) of the 
Medicines and Related Substance Control Act 101 of 1965 states that a health 
inspector may enter a place or premises from which a person authorised under that 
Act to compound or dispense medicines or scheduled substances or from which the 
holder of a licence as contemplated in s 22C(1)(b) conducts business or any 
premises, vehicle, place, vessel or aircraft if he or she has reason to suspect that an 
offence in terms of that Act has been or is being committed at or in such premises, 
place, vessel or aircraft or that an attempt has been made or is being made there to 
commit such an offence.  
119  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council case 886. 
120  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council case 888. 
121  Martinez Childhood Cancer Survivors Workplace Experiences 19. 
122  Martinez Childhood Cancer Survivors Workplace Experiences 19. 
123  Martinez Childhood Cancer Survivors Workplace Experiences 20. 
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Despite all these challenges which employees with cancer experience when 
it comes to disclosing their medical condition to employers, they are 
encouraged to disclose their medical condition, because a failure to do so 
can yield negative results for them. Managing a dangerous condition such 
as cancer can be burdensome on an isolated individual, and the stress 
could result in the loss of the psychological resources necessary for 
effective performance of a job, and necessary also to assist in the overall 
healing process.124 This is what Wegner and Lane describe as the "secrecy 
cycle of cancer", which is very consuming and detrimental to the overall 
health of the individual and must be avoided at all costs.125 One is compelled 
by this line of reasoning to agree with the sentiments of Collins and Miller, 
who argue that an employee with cancer who discloses that he or she has 
cancer is relieved of the burden of managing a displaced identity.126 
Disclosure can yield positive results for the employee, including job 
satisfaction, less job anxiety, and a greater commitment to working. These 
factors have been proven to lead to the speedy recovery of the employee 
with cancer. Working should be seen as a component of the regimen for 
treating cancer.127  
In C v Minister of Correctional Services,128 the plaintiff was working as a 
cook in prison while serving his sentence. One day all prisoners were 
informed about an HIV/AIDS test which everyone needed to do for purposes 
of screening for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. Emphasis was 
placed on the right of the prisoners to refuse to undergo such tests if they 
so wished and the plaintiff went for testing with the assistance of a fellow 
prisoner, where the test showed him to be HIV positive.129 The plaintiff 
instituted a claim against the defendant on the basis of the violation of his 
right to privacy. He stated that his right to privacy had been violated as he 
had not provided informed consent to undergo such a test in the first place. 
The defendant argued that the Department had adopted the concept that 
informed consent was a prerequisite for testing prisoners and specified the 
norms which had been applicable before this incident took place.130  
Judge Kirk-Cohen rejected the argument raised by the defendant on the 
basis that the information about the test, its purpose and the right to refuse 
                                            
124  Martinez Childhood Cancer Survivors Workplace Experiences 20-21. 
125  Wegner and Lane Emotion, Disclosure and Health 25. 
126  Collins and Miller 1994 Psychol Bull 457. 
127  Ashforth and Humphrey 1993 Acad Manag Rev 88. 
128  C v Minister of Correctional Services case 292. 
129  C v Minister of Correctional Services case para 20. 
130  C v Minister of Correctional Services case para 20. 
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to submit to the test had been communicated to the plaintiff as a member of 
a group of prisoners standing in a row in a passage, with no privacy and no 
time to reflect.131 What had been repeated to each prisoner in the consulting 
room had not been said by anyone trained in counselling and had also not 
been said privately but in the presence of fellow prisoners.132 This clearly 
showed that the plaintiff had not consented to the test in the first place, and 
thus the conduct of the defendant amounted to the violation of the right to 
privacy of the plaintiff as protected by the Constitution.133 
Another case in point that serves as authority in protecting the right to 
privacy in the health context is NM v Smith,134 where the names and HIV 
statuses of the three applicants were published in a biography without their 
knowledge and consent. The three applicants brought a claim to the court 
on the basis that the publication violated their right to privacy and human 
dignity as protected by the Constitution.135 The court was of the view that 
the respondents had been aware of the fact that the applicants had not given 
their consent with regard to the publication, but that they had gone ahead 
with the publication, thus violating the applicants' rights to privacy and 
human dignity. The use of pseudonyms would not have rendered the book 
less authentic and nowhere had it been shown to be in the public's interest 
to demand the publication of the real names of the applicants.136 The court 
ordered the respondents to compensate the applicants for the damages 
arising from the violation of their rights to privacy and human dignity as 
protected in terms of sections 10 and 14 of the Constitution, respectively.137 
                                            
131  C v Minister of Correctional Services case para 21. 
132  C v Minister of Correctional Services case para 21. 
133  C v Minister of Correctional Services case para 22. 
134  NM v Smith 2007 5 SA 250 (CC) (hereafter NM v Smith case) 251. Tshabalala-
Msimang v Makhanya 2008 1 All SA 509 (W) 509. The case involved the publication 
of confidential information about the Minister of Health, who had been admitted in 
hospital, and the respondents were the editor and publisher of the Sunday Times 
newspaper. The publication disclosed the medical records of the patient and that 
she had transgressed hospital rules on several occasions as she often drank alcohol 
while in hospital. The Minister approached the court to order the respondents to 
return her hospital records, which were in their possession, and further argued that 
the article violated her right to privacy in terms of s 14 of the National Health Act and 
the Constitution. The court held that the conduct of the respondents was unlawful as 
they had acquired the medical records of the applicant illegally and had also 
disclosed such confidential information, which was protected in terms of s 14 of the 
National Health Act and the Constitution. The court ruled in favour of the applicant 
because the conduct of the respondents violated her right to privacy. 
135  NM v Smith case para 22. 
136  NM v Smith case para 22. 
137  NM v Smith case para 22. 
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Based on the discussion above and the court cases which entrench the right 
to privacy, it is clear that the right to privacy of an employee with cancer is 
not lost when he or she discloses his or her current state of health to an 
employer, and the employer may not use such information beyond 
accommodating the employee in the workplace. Disclosure will serve as an 
aid allowing the employer to understand the medical condition of the 
employee and provide the necessary support through reasonable 
accommodation, among other things. Therefore a link can be identified 
between the operation of the constitutional right to privacy and the right to 
fair labour practices in the context of the legal issues which affect 
employees with cancer. In order for the employer to execute his or her 
obligations, he or she ought to know about the employee's condition, and 
this requires disclosure of such information by the employee. This amounts 
to a justifiable limitation of the employee's right to privacy for the purposes 
of enabling the employer to uphold and protect the employee's rights to 
privacy and to fair labour practices. The truth regarding all the constitutional 
rights granted by our Constitution is emphasised here; which is that these 
rights are not absolute and at times ought to be reasonably and justifiably 
limited in order to ensure that they are effectively enforced.  
8 Conclusion 
It is quite clear from the above that a balance can be maintained between 
the duty of the employer to reasonably accommodate an employee with 
cancer in the workplace and not violate the employee's right to privacy while 
executing this duty. This will be possible if the employer does not abuse his 
or her position of authority, and does not use the information about the 
medical condition of the employee contrary to the purpose for which it was 
disclosed for by the employee concerned. 
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